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THE VIEW FROM THE BOTTOM: CONSUMER-DIRECTED 
MEDICAID AND COST-SHIFTING TO PATIENTS 
SIDNEY D. WATSON* 
Consumer-directed health care has emerged as one of the most influential 
ideas in health care policy.1  Its supporters hypothesize that health care costs 
are high and quality is low because our current system of health insurance fails 
to provide consumers with incentives to use care wisely and shop for high 
value services.2  Advocates of consumer-directed health care argue that giving 
patients financial incentives—through higher out-of-pocket costs—to take 
personal responsibility for their own health and health care will create market 
forces to control costs and improve quality and outcomes.3  If patients have 
“skin in the game,” the demand for unnecessary medical services will be 
curtailed. 
When adherents of consumer-directed health care turn to Medicaid, they 
complain that federal Medicaid rules prevent states from requiring that 
recipients accept personal responsibility for the costs of their care.4  They warn 
that moral hazard is a problem with any health insurance, but it is an even 
bigger problem with Medicaid because Medicaid offers more generous 
coverage than private health insurance and imposes only very small patient 
cost-sharing.5 
 
* Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law Center for Health Law Studies.  My 
thanks to Sarah Kaufman, Rebecca Frigy, and Emily Simpson who provided exceptional research 
assistance and advice.  My thanks also to the other speakers at the Saint Louis University School 
of Law Health Law Symposium and to those who participated in the 2006 Suffolk University 
Law School Health Law and Policy Forum for their comments and suggestions. 
 1. Melinda Beeuwkes Buntin et al., Consumer-Directed Health Care: Early Evidence 
About Effects on Cost and Quality, HEALTH AFF., Oct. 24, 2006, at w516, http://content.health 
affairs.org/cgi/reprint/25/6/w516.pdf. 
 2. See id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Michael F. Cannon, Medicaid’s Unseen Costs, 548 CATO INST. POL’Y ANALYSIS 1, 9 
(2005). 
 5. Id.  “Moral hazard” posits that individuals are likely to incur more costs when someone 
else is financially responsible.  See John A. Nyman, Is “Moral Hazard” Inefficient?  The Policy 
Implications of a New Theory, HEALTH AFF., Sept.-Oct. 2004, at 194, 194.  Proponents of 
consumer-directed health care often use the example of free coffee at the office to illustrate their 
point.  People drink more coffee when they do not have to pay for it.  Charging for the coffee will 
drive down consumption and thus drive down costs for coffee.  In this worldview, imposing more 
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These partisans describe Medicaid as no longer a safety net for the “truly 
needy,” but a program that includes those who should be able to purchase 
health insurance or health care in the private market.  They do not believe that 
working families need the comprehensive coverage that Medicaid provides—  
coverage that mimics employer-sponsored insurance should be adequate.  
Consumer-directed Medicaid proclaims: “[A]nyone can pay a few dollars, 
personal responsibility is important.” 
As in the private sector, consumer-directed Medicaid has emerged as a 
new, powerful vision in an ongoing debate about Medicaid’s form and future.  
A few states have begun applying the tools of consumer-driven health care to 
Medicaid, reducing benefits and increasing patient costs.6  Florida has made 
the boldest move: an approved Section 1115 Waiver that transforms Medicaid 
from health insurance into a defined-benefit voucher program.7  Now the 
Deficit Reduction Act (DRA) of 2005 gives states unprecedented flexibility to 
transform Medicaid in the direction of consumer-directed health care through 
increased patient cost-sharing, limited-benefit packages benchmarked to 
private insurance coverage, and high-deductible Medicaid plans linked to 
Health Savings Accounts.8 
Yet consumer-directed Medicaid rests on myths and misconceptions.  Part 
I of this article provides an overview of Medicaid’s structure, explaining its 
unique design as a safety net insurer.  Part I concludes with an analysis of 
recent Medicaid enrollment increases and the financial pressures that have led 
states to call for Medicaid reform.  Part II explains how consumer-directed 
health care has stepped into the Medicaid reform debate.  In particular, Part II 
examines three aspects of the DRA of 2005—increased cost-sharing, limited-
benefit packages, and vouchers—that give states new discretion to shift costs 
to Medicaid patients. 
Part III explains why consumer-directed health care is a misdiagnosis for 
Medicaid.  While Medicaid recipients are no longer just very poor welfare 
recipients, the near poor and even moderate-income Americans can no longer 
afford the premiums and out-of-pocket costs imposed by private insurance.  
Medicaid is a cost-effective health insurer with a track record of providing 
quality medical care.  The prescription should be more Medicaid, not less.  
Medicaid recipients do not use extra, unnecessary medical services.  The 
challenge for Medicaid recipients is not too little personal responsibility but 
too much. 
 
costs on patients will cause them to become more astute users and discourage unnecessary use of 
medical services, driving down costs and driving up quality. 
 6. See infra Part II. 
 7. See infra Part II.D. 
 8. CONG. BUDGET OFF., COST ESTIMATE: S. 1932 DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT OF 2005 40–
42 (2006), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/70xx/doc7028/s1932conf.pdf. 
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I.  MEDICAID: THE VIEW FROM ABOVE 
Medicaid is the nation’s safety net health insurance program.9  Codified at 
Title XIX of the Social Security Act, Medicaid is a joint federal-state program 
that provides federal financial assistance to states operating approved medical-
assistance plans.10  Federal law outlines broad “mandatory” requirements that 
state Medicaid programs must meet, but states retain considerable flexibility to 
cover additional “optional” eligibility groups and categories of services.11  
States may also seek “waivers” from the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services to use Medicaid funds to pay for services not otherwise authorized by 
the federal statute and regulations.12  As a result, Medicaid eligibility and 
services vary widely among states, and Medicaid operates as fifty-one distinct 
programs—one in each state and the District of Columbia. 
Medicaid’s joint federal-state structure has made Medicaid an attractive 
financing option for states looking to cover new health care needs for 
vulnerable populations.  The federal Medicaid contribution is open-ended, 
limited only by the amount of state funds individual states are willing to 
contribute.13  The federal match rate ranges from 50% to 77%, depending on 
the state’s per capita income—with poorer states entitled to a higher federal 
contribution.14  With an average federal match rate of 57%, Medicaid allows 
states to, at a minimum, “double their money” by using Medicaid to finance 
medical care.15 
As a result, Medicaid has grown to finance an astonishing range of safety 
net health insurance expansions, public health initiatives, and state health 
reform initiatives.16  Medicaid now provides health insurance for over 55 
million children, parents, seniors, and persons with disabilities, covering more 
 
 9. See generally ROBERT STEVENS & ROSEMARY STEVENS, WELFARE MEDICINE IN 
AMERICA: A CASE STUDY IN MEDICAID (1974) (providing a thorough history of the passage and 
initial years of Medicaid). 
 10. See 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1396–1396v (2003 & Supp. 2006). 
 11. See id. §§ 1396(a), 1396(d). 
 12. Section 1115 of the Social Security Act gives the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services broad authority to waive statutory and regulatory provisions of health and welfare 
programs, like Medicaid.  42 U.S.C.A. § 1315(a)(1) (2003 & Supp. 2006).  Section 1915(c) of the 
Act gives the Secretary authority to waive statutory and regulatory provisions to allow states to 
operate home and community based long-term programs.  Id. § 1396(n).  Managed care programs 
are operated by many states under Section 1915(b) waivers. 
 13. ANDY SCHNEIDER ET AL., KAISER COMM’N ON MEDICAID & UNINSURED, THE 
MEDICAID RESOURCE BOOK, 86 (2002), available at http://www.kff.org/medicaid/2236-
index.cfm. 
 14. Id. at 89–90. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Sarah Rosenbaum & David Rousseau, Medicaid at Thirty-Five, 45 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 7, 
9–10 (2001). 
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Americans than Medicare or any private health insurer.17  Medicaid is now the 
largest source of federal funds to states, accounting for 44% of all federal 
funding that goes to states.18 
As Medicaid has grown, it has become three programs in one: First, it is a 
safety net health insurance program providing acute care physician, hospital, 
and prescription drug coverage to children, parents, and pregnant women.  
Medicaid now insures a quarter of all children in the U.S.19  It pays for 37% of 
births in the U.S.20 
Second, Medicaid is the nation’s primary source of financing for long-term 
care, both institutional and community based services.  Medicaid funds 46% of 
all nursing home care.21  Medicaid “home and community based waiver” 
programs serve the frail elderly, children and adults with physical and 
developmental disabilities, and persons with HIV/AIDS.22  It is the leading 
source of funding for community based long-term care services.23  Medicaid 
also pays for over half of all publicly financed mental health care in the U.S.24 
Third, Medicaid fills in gaps in Medicare.  Although Medicare provides 
near-universal coverage for people over age 65, it has substantial gaps in 
coverage.25  Medicare provides almost no long-term care benefits, either in 
nursing homes or community settings.26  It also has substantial deductibles and 
co-payments.27  Until the enactment of Medicare Part D, Medicare provided no 
 
 17. VERNON SMITH ET AL., KAISER COMM’N ON MEDICAID & UNINSURED, LOW MEDICAID 
SPENDING GROWTH AMID REBOUNDING STATE REVENUES: RESULTS FROM A 50-STATE 
MEDICAID BUDGET SURVEY STATE FISCAL YEARS 2006 AND 2007 5 (2006), available at 
http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/7569.pdf. 
 18. Id. 
 19. News Release, Comm. on Fin., Floor Statement of U.S. Senator Max Baucus on Motion 
to Instruct Conferees Regarding Medicaid Provisions in Budget Reconciliation Spending 
Legislation (Dec. 13, 2005), available at http://finance.senate.gov/press/Bpress/2005press/ 
prb121205sub.pdf. 
 20. Daniel C. Vock, Medicaid: Biggest Insurer is a Budget Buster, STATELINE.ORG, Aug. 3, 
2006, http://www.stateline.org/live/printable/story?contentId=131622. 
 21. Medicaid and Long-Term Care Services, MEDICAID FACTS (Kaiser Comm’n on 
Medicaid & Uninsured, Washington, D.C.), July 2006, available at http://www.kff.org/medicaid/ 
upload/Medicaid-and-Long-Term-Care-Services-PDF.pdf. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Jeffery A. Buck, Medicaid, Health Care Financing Trends and the Future of State-Based 
Public Mental Health Services, 54 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 969, 969 (2003), available at 
http://psychservices.psychiatryonline.org/cgi/reprint/54/7/969.pdf.  Medicaid pays for both 
clinical services and psychotropic medications.  Id. 
 25. See PETER H. STOLOFF ET AL., CNA CORP. & INST. FOR DEF. ANALYSES, EVALUATION 
OF THE TRICARE PROGRAM: FY 2002 REPORT TO CONGRESS 5-16–5-22 (2002), available at 
http://www.tricare.mil/ocfo/_docs/eval_report_fy02.pdf. 
 26. See id. at 5-17. 
 27. See id. at 5-16–5-18. 
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outpatient prescription drug coverage.28  Medicaid fills these gaps for low-
income seniors who are “dually eligible” for full Medicaid benefits.  Medicaid 
also provides limited benefits—paying Medicare premiums, deductibles, and 
co-payments—for Medicare recipients with incomes up to 120% of the FPL.29 
Medicaid also fills gaps in private insurance coverage.  Medicaid has never 
mimicked private insurance coverage.  Because Medicaid has always covered 
more—and different—services than private insurers, it has been uniquely 
positioned to grow to cover evolving safety net health care needs.30 
In the acute care arena, Medicaid has always given states the option to 
cover important medical care services excluded from 1965-era private 
insurance and still not covered by many private plans—prescription drugs, 
dental care, rehabilitation, and physical therapy services.31  Medicaid’s Early 
Periodic Screening Diagnosis and Treatment (EPSDT) Program, added to the 
federal Medicaid law in 1967, was the country’s first, and remains the most, 
comprehensive preventive health and treatment program for children.32  
Medicaid is the only health insurance that covers non-emergency 
transportation to and from medical care.33 
Medicaid also requires states to cover treatments for chronic diseases and 
congenital conditions routinely excluded by private insurance.34  Private 
insurance typically limits coverage to services necessary to “restore normal 
functioning” following an “illness or injury.”35  The “illness or injury” 
 
 28. Medicare Learning Network, Important Information about Medicare Coverage of Drugs 
Under Part B and the New Medicare Prescription Drug Coverage (Part D), and Vaccines 
Administered in a Physician’s Office—The Ninth in the MLN Matters Series on the New 
Prescription Drug Plans, MLN MATTERS (Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Washington, 
D.C.), at 2, available at www.cms.hhs.gov/MLNMattersArticles/downloads/SE0507.pdf (last 
visited Feb. 28, 2007). 
 29. Social Security Act §§ 1902(a)(10)(A)(i)(I), 1902(a)(10)(A)(ii)(IV), 
1902(a)(10)(A)(ii)(X), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a (2003 & Supp. 2006). 
 30. See Rosenbaum & Rousseau, supra note 16; SMITH ET AL., supra note 17, at 5. 
 31. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a(a)(10)(A) (2003 & Supp. 2006) (listing Medicaid mandatory 
services); id. § 1396d(a)(xiii)(4) (listing Medicaid optional services); STEVENS & STEVENS, supra 
note 9, at 65–67; see also Kaiser Fam. Found., Medicaid: A Timeline of Key Developments 
(1965–1969), http://www.kff.org/Medicaid/timeline/pf_65.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2007). 
 32. See JANE PERKINS & SARAH SOMERS, NAT’L HEALTH L. PROGRAM, TOWARD A 
HEALTHY FUTURE: MEDICAID EARLY AND PERIODIC SCREENING, DIAGNOSTIC AND TREATMENT 
SERVICES FOR POOR CHILDREN AND YOUTH 21–23 (2003). 
 33. Health Coverage for Low-Income Populations: A Comparison of Medicaid and SCHIP 
(Kaiser Comm’n on Medicaid & Uninsured), Apr. 2006, at 3, fig. 4, http://www.kff.org/medicaid/ 
upload/7488.pdf [hereinafter Health Coverage for Low-Income Populations]. 
 34. See Rosenbaum & Rousseau, supra note 16, at 12–14 (discussing this distinction 
between Medicaid and private insurance).  States have discretion to set reasonable limits on 
Medicaid coverage, but states may not discriminate in the provision of medically necessary 
services solely because of the type of condition or diagnosis.  See 42 C.F.R. § 440.225 (2004). 
 35. See Rosenbaum & Rousseau, supra note 16, at 13. 
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requirement excludes treatments for cerebral palsy and other developmental 
conditions which are defined as neither “illness” nor “injury.”36  The “restore 
normal functioning” standard excludes treatments that improve quality of life, 
but do not correct the underlying condition, such as occupational or speech 
therapy for a child with autism. 37 
Medicaid covers the long-term care services not provided by private health 
insurance.  Medicaid mandatory services include nursing home care,38 and 
states have the option to cover intermediate care facilities, a crucial source of 
residential care for children and adults with developmental disabilities.39  Over 
the years, Congress has given states increasing options to use Medicaid to pay 
for long-term care in community settings including coverage for personal care, 
habilitation, case management, and a variety of other “home and community 
based” services.40 
In recognition that Medicaid insures the poorest Americans, Medicaid has 
protected beneficiaries from the out of pocket costs typically imposed by 
private insurers.  While Medicare has always imposed substantial premiums, 
deductibles and co-payments, Medicaid, as originally enacted, prohibited states 
from imposing any premiums or cost-sharing on Medicaid recipients.41  In the 
early 1980s, the Medicaid Act was amended to allow states to impose 
“nominal” co-payments for most services for adults, but still prohibited co-
pays for children’s services.42  In 2005, when private insurers were typically 
imposing co-payments of $15 to $25 for physician visits and $11 to $38 for 
prescription drugs,43 Medicaid capped co-payments at $0.50 to $3.00 per 
service.44  Moreover, while Medicaid recipients are legally obligated to pay 
cost-sharing amounts, providers have historically been prohibited from 
 
 36. Id. 
 37. See, e.g., Bedrick v Travelers Ins. Co., 93 F.3d 149, 151 (4th Cir. 1996); see also 
Rosenbaum &  Rousseau, supra note 16, at 13–14 (discussing these provisions). 
 38. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396d(a)(xiii)(4) (2003 & Supp. 2006) (listing Medicaid optional 
services); STEVENS & STEVENS, supra note 9, at 65–67; see also Kaiser Fam. Found., supra note 
31. 
 39. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396d(a)(xiii)(4) (2003 & Supp. 2006) (listing Medicaid optional 
services). 
 40. Id. 
 41. JONATHAN ENGEL, POOR PEOPLE’S MEDICINE: MEDICAID AND AMERICAN CHARITY 
CARE SINCE 1965 50 (2006). 
 42. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396o(a)–(b) (1982); 42 C.F.R. § 447.53 (1986).  Co-pays were also 
prohibited for emergency services, family planning, hospice care, and institutionalized 
individuals.  42 U.S.C. § 1396o(a)–(b) (1982); 42 C.F.R. § 447.53 (1986).  States were 
specifically prohibited from imposing premiums or enrollment fees.  42 U.S.C. § 1396o(a)(1) 
(1982). 
 43. KAISER FAM. FOUND. & HEALTH RES. & EDUC. TRUST, EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS: 
2006 ANNUAL SURVEY 78, 124 (2006), available at http://www.kff.org/insurance/7527/ 
upload/7527.pdf [hereinafter KFF/HRET 2006 ANNUAL SURVEY]. 
 44. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396o(a)(3) (2003); 42 C.F.R. §§ 447.54, 447.55 (2005). 
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denying care, services, or drugs to Medicaid recipients who are unable to make 
their co-payments.45 
Initially, Medicaid’s safety net health insurance coverage was linked to 
cash welfare payments: Medicaid was an additional benefit for single mothers 
and their children receiving Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), 
and aged, blind, or disabled persons receiving disability and old age 
assistance.46  Over the last forty years, Medicaid has delinked from welfare and 
expanded to cover more poor and near-poor Americans.  However, the 
Medicaid statute still uses categorical as well as income eligibility standards—
a holdover from its beginnings as an adjunct to welfare—and the primary 
categories of Medicaid eligibility remain fairly close to those recognized by the 
world of cash welfare.47 
The federal Act now authorizes states to extend Medicaid coverage to 
children and to adults who are parents, pregnant women, disabled, or elderly.48  
Children’s eligibility now depends solely on family income rather than single 
parent status, and states may use the State Children’s Health Insurance 
Program (SCHIP) to extend Medicaid or other government-subsidized 
coverage to children in families earning up to 200% of the federal poverty line 
(FPL).49  For parents, categorical eligibility now extends beyond single parents 
to all poor parents.50  However, federal law still prohibits states, absent a 
waiver, from offering Medicaid coverage to non-parent, non-disabled adults.51  
A few states have such waivers, but in forty-two states childless adults cannot 
qualify for Medicaid.52 
 
 45. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396o(e) (2003). 
 46. STEVENS & STEVENS, supra note 9, at 61–62. 
 47. Social Security Act § 1902(a)(10)(A)(i), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a (2003 & Supp. 2006); id. 
§ 1902(a)(47), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a; id. § 1920A, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396r-1a (2003). 
 48. Id. §§ 1902(a)(10)(A)(ii), 1902(aa), 1905(b)(4), 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1396a (2003 & Supp. 
2006).  The Medicaid Act also allows states to cover a few other discrete categories of adults, 
including women seeking treatment for breast and cervical cancer.  See 42 U.S.C.A. § 
1396(aa)(3) (2003).  Forty-four states have opted to provide Medicaid coverage for this treatment 
for these low income uninsured women. 
 49. The federal Medicaid Act also requires states to cover children who are recipients of 
adoption assistance and foster care under Title IV-E of the Social Services Act.  42 U.S.C.A § 
1396a(a)(10)(A)(ii)(VIII) (2003 & Supp. 2006). 
 50. Title XIX only requires that states cover parents living in single parent households or 
two-parent households in which the primary wage earner is unemployed.  However, Title XIX 
also gives states the option to cover all two-parent families.  42 U.S.C.A. § 1396u (2003 & Supp. 
2006). 
 51. Marc Steinberg, Working Without A Net: The Health Care Safety Net Still Leaves 
Millions of Low-Income Workers Uninsured, SPECIAL REPORT (Families USA, Washington, 
D.C.), Apr. 2004, at 3, available at http://www.familiesusa.org/assets/pdfs/Holes_2004_update_ 
revb622.pdf. 
 52. Id. at 1, 3. 
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Federal Medicaid categorical eligibility rules remain mired in Medicaid’s 
history as a welfare benefit, but Medicaid has changed: it is no longer a 
program for welfare recipients.  Twenty years ago, 75% of Medicaid recipients 
were also receiving welfare benefits.53  Now, close to 75% of Medicaid 
recipients receive no cash welfare assistance.54  Most Medicaid recipients are 
children and parents in working families, but less than 20% of families with 
Medicaid also receive Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) or 
other welfare assistance.55  Even among the elderly and disabled, where 
Medicaid eligibility typically is linked to qualifying for Supplemental Security 
Income (SSI), almost half of Medicaid recipients receive no SSI payments.56 
Medicaid now finances health and long-term care for over 55 million 
Americans.57 Medicaid provides health insurance to 42% of non-elderly 
Americans with incomes below 100% of the FPL, and 27% of those with 
incomes between 100% to 199% of the FPL.58  More than half (53%) of 
Medicaid recipients are very poor, earning under 100% of the FPL, and 28% 
are near poor, earning between 100% to 200% of the FPL.59 
 
 53. Id. 
 54. STAFF OF H. COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 106TH CONG., 2000 GREEN BOOK: 
BACKGROUND MATERIAL ON PROGRAMS WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE COMMITTEE ON 
WAYS AND MEANS (Comm.Print 2000); see also EILEEN R. ELLIS ET AL., KAISER COMM’N ON 
MEDICAID & UNINSURED, MEDICAID ENROLLMENT IN 50 STATES: DECEMBER 2002 DATA 
UPDATE (2003) (noting that as of December 1997, only 27.8% of Medicaid recipients also 
received cash welfare). 
 55. VERNON K. SMITH & GREG MOODY, NAT’L GOVERNORS ASS’N, MEDICAID IN 2005: 
PRINCIPLES & PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 7–8 (2005), available at http://www.nga.org/Files/pdf/ 
0502MEDICAID.pdf. 
 56. Id.; see also ELLIS ET AL., supra note 54 (noting that as of December 1997, only 27.8% 
of Medicaid recipients also received cash welfare). 
 57. SMITH ET AL., supra note 17, at 5. 
 58. The Medicaid Program at a Glance, MEDICAID FACTS (Kaiser Comm’n on Medicaid & 
Uninsured, Washington, D.C.), May 2006, at fig. 4, available at http://www.kff.org/medicaid/ 
upload/7235.pdf (including as part of Medicaid figures SCHIP, other state programs, Medicare, 
and military related coverage). 
 59. Kaiser Fam. Found., State Health Fact: Distribution of the Nonelderly with Medicaid by 
Federal Poverty Level (FPL), http://www.statehealthfacts.org/ (Click 50 State Comparisons link; 
Select Medicaid & SCHIP Category; Scroll down left panel and select Distribution by FPL under 
Health Coverage & Uninsured: Nonelderly With Medicaid) (last visited Feb. 28, 2007).  
Commentators typically classify the “very poor” as people with incomes up to 100% of the FPL 
and the “near-poor” as those with incomes between 100% to 200% of the FPL; they use the term 
“low-income” when referring to all those earning below 200% of the FPL.  Many refer to those 
with incomes in the 200% to 400% FPL income range as moderate income.  See infra text 
accompanying notes 143–152 (providing an explanation of why the FPL understates the number 
of Americans who fail to earn enough to meet their basic needs). 
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Medicaid plays a crucial role in maintaining the nation’s health care 
delivery system.  With projected expenditures of over $300 billion in 2006,60 
Medicaid supports 17% of all spending for personal health care, including 17% 
of hospital care, 46% of nursing home costs, and 19% of prescription drug 
costs.61  Medicaid accounts for 41% of revenues for safety net hospitals,62 and 
one-third of the funding for community health centers, including federally 
qualified health clinics serving medically underserved inner city areas as well 
as rural health clinics and migrant clinics.63  Medicaid also helps finance 
special education services in public schools by funding medically necessary 
therapies provided in school settings.64 
But Medicaid enrollment—particularly among parents and children—tends 
to be countercyclical: when the economy is good and jobs are plentiful, lower 
wage workers have more access to both jobs and employer-sponsored health 
insurance.  When the economy slows down and people lose jobs and health 
benefits, workers and their children become eligible for Medicaid and turn to it 
to tide them over until the economy picks up. 
The countercyclical nature of Medicaid enrollment imposes a substantial 
fiscal burden on states.  State tax revenues—from income, sales, and payroll 
taxes—decline when the economy slows down: just when states need 
additional revenue, rather than less, to pay for the increased  demand for 
Medicaid.65  Medicaid is the second-largest expenditure in most states’ general 
fund budgets, accounting for 18% of state revenue spending compared with 
36% spent for elementary and secondary education. 66  States feel the pinch 
when demand grows for even more Medicaid funding. 
Medicaid’s countercyclical pattern hit states most recently during the 2001 
recession.  The slow economic recovery fueled a jump in Medicaid 
enrollment,67 and total Medicaid spending spiked by more than 20% from 2000 
 
 60. Off. Mgmt. & Budget, The Nation’s Fiscal Outlook, http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/ 
budget/fy2006/outlook.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2007). 
 61. KAISER COMM’N ON MEDICAID & UNINSURED, MEDICAID: A PRIMER, KEY 
BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON THE NATION’S HEALTH INSURANCE PROGRAM FOR LOW-
INCOME AMERICANS 8 (2005), available at http://www.kff.org/medicaid/7334.cfm. 
 62. Diane Rowland & Rachel Garfield, Health Care for the Poor: Medicaid at Thirty-Five, 
22 HEALTH CARE FINANCING REV. 23, 23–24 (2000). 
 63. Sara Rosenbaum et al., Health Centers’ Role as Safety Net Providers for Medicaid 
Patients and the Uninsured, ISSUE PAPER (Kaiser Comm’n on Medicaid & Uninsured, 
Washington, D.C.), Feb. 2000, at 5–6, fig. 5, available at http://www.kff.org/medicaid/2181-
index.cfm. 
 64. Alan Weil, There’s Something About Medicaid, HEALTH AFF., Jan.-Feb. 2003, at 13, 22–
23. 
 65. See SMITH ET AL., supra note 17, at 14. 
 66. Id. at 13–14. 
 67. VERNON SMITH ET AL., KAISER COMM’N ON MEDICAID & UNINSURED, THE 
CONTINUING MEDICAID BUDGET CHALLENGE: STATE MEDICAID SPENDING GROWTH AND COST 
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to 2002, while state general revenue funding plummeted.68  States complained 
that large Medicaid spending increases were outstripping state revenue 
increases and crowding out other important state budget needs like education.69 
Governors began describing Medicaid as a program that was 
“unsustainable,” and the National Governors Association called for changes in 
Medicaid to reduce the burden on state coffers.70  Some of their proposals are 
familiar refrains in an ongoing debate about the relative roles that federal and 
state governments should play in funding and administering the joint federal-
state safety net program, and whether the federally funded Medicare program 
should function more as a safety net insurer.71  Governors argue that the costs 
of nursing home care for the nation’s elderly should be shifted to Medicare—a 
federally funded program.72  They maintain that federally funded Medicare 
should take over the costs now born by Medicaid for low-income “dually 
eligible” seniors who depend on Medicaid coverage to pay Medicare 
premiums, deductibles, and co-payments, and to other gaps in Medicare home 
and community based coverage.73  The governors also propose removing 
federal limits on categorical eligibility to allow states to cover non-disabled, 
non-parent adults without a special Medicaid waiver.74  In general, state 
governors appeal for increased federal law flexibility to allow states to 
restructure their Medicaid programs via statutorily authorized optional service 
and eligibility categories without being required to go through the Medicaid 
waiver processes.75 
State pleas for Medicaid reform through shifting costs from the states to 
the federal government are familiar cries in the world of Medicaid reform, but 
recently the National Governors Association took up a new refrain: demands 
for increased state flexibility to shift more of the costs of care onto Medicaid 
beneficiaries.76  Proposals for Medicaid cost-shifting to patients are fueled by 
the same theories pushing consumer-directed health care in private insurance 
as well as concerns that Medicaid is displacing employer-sponsored insurance. 
 
CONTAINMENT IN FISCAL YEARS 2004 AND 2005 1 (2004), available at http://www.kff.org/ 
medicaid/7190.cfm; John Holahan & Arunabh Ghosh, Understanding the Recent Growth in 
Medicaid Spending, 2000–2003, HEALTH AFF., Jan. 26, 2005, at W5–52 (Jan. 26, 2005), 
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w5.52v1.pdf. 
 68. SMITH ET AL., supra note 17, at 5–6. 
 69. SMITH & MOODY, supra note 55, at 9. 
 70. See, e.g., NAT’L GOVERNORS ASS’N, SHORT-RUN MEDICAID REFORM (Aug. 29, 2005), 
available at http://www.nga.org/Files/pdf/0508MEDICAIDREFORM.PDF. 
 71. See id. 
 72. NAT’L GOVERNORS ASS’N, MEDICAID REFORM: A PRELIMINARY REPORT 2 (June 15, 
2005), available at http://www.nga.org/Files/pdf/0506medicaid.pdf. 
 73. Id. at 2. 
 74. Id. at 6–7. 
 75. Id. 
 76. SMITH & MOODY, supra note 55, at 14. 
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II.  SHIFTING COSTS TO PATIENTS: CONSUMER-DIRECTED MEDICAID 
Proponents of consumer-directed health care worry that health insurance 
shelters patients from the costs of health care causing patients to use 
unnecessary services and drives up costs. 77  They warn that this problem is 
particularly acute with Medicaid because Medicaid offers more generous 
coverage than private health insurance and imposes little or only very small 
patient cost-sharing. 78 
These advocates point out that Medicaid recipients are no longer 
exclusively the very poor welfare recipients that the program was designed to 
serve in 1965, but predominately working parents and children.79  They argue 
that working families on Medicaid should not get better health insurance 
coverage than working families with private employer sponsored insurance.80  
They worry that Medicaid discourages work because it is means-tested, and 
thus recipients may forgo work because of fear of losing Medicaid coverage.81  
They describe the program as “discouraging self-sufficiency and encouraging 
dependence among beneficiaries”82 and fear that the existence of Medicaid 
causes low-income workers to forgo purchasing private insurance and results 
in employers of low-income workers failing to offer coverage.83 
As in the private sector, consumer-directed Medicaid has emerged as a 
new vision in an old Medicaid reform debate.  A few states, including Utah 
and Oregon, have Medicaid waivers to offer limited-benefit packages that 
make Medicaid coverage more like private insurance.84  New Mexico, 
Washington, and a handful of other states have approved Medicaid waivers to 
increase patient cost-sharing.85  South Carolina submitted a waiver seeking 
permission to give recipients the option of Medicaid high-deductible 
catastrophic coverage with health savings accounts.86  Florida has an approved 
 
 77. Buntin, et al., supra note 1, at w516. 
 78. Cannon, supra note 4, at 9. 
 79. Id. at 2. 
 80. Id. at 16–17. 
 81. Id. at 5. 
 82. Cannon, supra note 4, at 1. 
 83. Id. at 7. 
 84. Samantha Artiga & Cindy Mann, New Directions for Medicaid Section 1115 Waivers: 
Policy Implications of Recent Waiver Activity, POL’Y BRIEF (Kaiser Comm’n on Medicaid & 
Uninsured, Washington, D.C.), Mar. 2005, at 3, available at http://www.kff.org/Medicaid/ 
7286.cfm; Overview of the Utah Section 1115 Waiver, MEDICAID FACTS (Kaiser Comm’n on 
Medicaid  Uninsured, Washington, D.C.), July 2004, at 1, available at http://www.kff.org/ 
medicaid/upload/Utah-Section-1115-Waiver-Fact-Sheet.pdf. 
 85. Artiga & Mann, supra note 84, at 3. 
 86. Judith Solomon, Still Risky Business: South Carolina’s Revised Medicaid Waiver 
Proposal (Ctr. on Budget & Pol’y Priorities, Washington, D.C.), Jan. 11, 2006, at 1, available at 
http://www.cbpp.org/1-11-06health.pdf. 
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waiver to replace Medicaid health insurance with a defined-contribution 
voucher.87 
Congress has also jumped on the consumer-directed Medicaid bandwagon: 
The Deficit Reduction Act (DRA) of 2005 gives states unprecedented 
flexibility to cost shift to patients without federal waiver approval.88  Ushering 
in possibly the most far-reaching changes to the Medicaid program since its 
creation in 1965, the DRA gives states new authority to offer thinner benefit 
packages that make Medicaid coverage more like private insurance, increase 
patient cost-sharing, and allow states to transform Medicaid from a health 
insurance program with defined benefits to a defined-contribution voucher 
system.89  These provisions—along with Florida’s Medicaid Waiver that 
allows the state to convert Medicaid into a voucher system—signal a new era 
of experimentation with consumer-directed Medicaid. 
A. Increased Patient Cost-Sharing 
The DRA adds a new section to the Medicaid Act that, for the first time, 
gives states the option to impose substantial patient cost-sharing, including co-
payments, co-insurance, premiums, and deductibles.  The Act removes 
previous federal law requiring that premiums and cost-sharing be comparable 
for all eligibility groups, allowing states to vary premiums and cost-sharing for 
parents, children, the disabled, and the aged. 
States may now impose cost-sharing as high as 20% of the cost of the 
service for those with incomes above 150% of the FPL and up to 10% of cost 
for those with incomes between 100% to 150% of the FPL.90  Those with 
incomes below 100% of the FPL are still subject to the current “nominal” co-
payment limit of $0.50 to $3 per service, but these ceilings will increase 
annually pegged to the medical care component of the Consumer Price 
 
 87. Florida Medicaid Waiver: Key Program Changes and Issues, MEDICAID FACTS (Kaiser 
Comm’n on Medicaid & Uninsured, Washington, D.C.), Dec. 2005, at 1, available at 
http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/7443.pdf. 
 88. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396o-1 (West 2006).  For a discussion of the competing political 
philosophies that resulted in the DRA, see Sara Rosenbaum, Medicaid at Forty: Revisiting 
Structure and Meaning in a Post-Deficit Reduction Act Era, 9 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 5 
(2006). 
 89. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396o-1 (West 2006). 
 90. Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 § 6041(b)(1)(B), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396o-1 (West 2006).  
The DRA does not address those with incomes below 100% of the FPL, but the Centers for 
Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) has indicated that pre-DRA provisions limiting cost-
sharing to “nominal” amounts remain in effect for these recipients.  Letter from Dennis G. Smith, 
Director for Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., to State Medicaid Director (June 16, 2006), 
available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/smdl/downloads/SMD061606.pdf.  CMS indicates that it 
will be providing further guidance on those with incomes below 100% through the administrative 
rule-making process.  Id. 
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Index—a figure that has been rising twice as fast as the general inflation rate.91  
States may also charge premiums to children and adults in families with 
incomes over 150% of the FPL.92 
States are still prohibited from charging co-pays for children’s preventive 
care.  Co-pays also remain prohibited for pregnancy-related services, family 
planning, institutionalized individuals, emergency services, and treatment for 
breast or cervical cancer.93 
However, all other services can be subject to co-payments.94  States may 
impose co-payments for sick child care for children up to age 5 with incomes 
above 133% of the FPL and for children age 6 and older with incomes above 
100% of the FPL.95  The DRA also authorizes states to create separate co-
payment requirements for non-preferred prescription drugs.96  States using this 
prescription drug option may impose cost-sharing on all Medicaid recipients 
including all children: No services or groups are exempt from cost-sharing for 
non-preferred drugs.97 
The DRA limits total out-of-pocket costs—premiums, deductibles, and co-
payments—to 5% of family income, computed on either a monthly or quarterly 
basis.98  However, families, not the state, are responsible for keeping track of 
when cost-sharing hits the 5% ceiling.  This documentation can be difficult for 
families, especially when income and expenses vary throughout the year. 
 
 91. Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 § 6041(b), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396o-1 (West 2006); Leighton 
Ku et al., The House Reconciliation Bill’s Provisions on Medicaid Co-Payments and Premiums: 
Are They Mild or Harsh? (Ctr. on Budget & Pol’y Priorities, Washington, D.C.), Nov. 22, 2005, 
available at http://www.cbpp.org/11-10-05health.pdf. 
 92. Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 § 6041(b)(2)(A), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396o-1 (West 2006).  
The only groups exempted from premiums are pregnant women, those receiving hospice care, 
institutionalized individuals, and women receiving breast or cervical cancer treatment.  See id. § 
6041(b)(3)(A), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396o-1.  Children in a “mandatory” category of Medicaid 
eligibility are also exempt from premium requirements.  See id.  But except for children in foster 
care, children who are mandatory eligibles live in families with incomes below 150% of the FPL, 
i.e., children who are ages 0 to 5 with incomes up to 133% of the FPL and children 6 and older 
with incomes up to 100% of the FPL.  See id. 
 93. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396o-1(b)(3)(B)(ii)–(ix). 
 94. Id.  Children ages 0 to 5 with incomes below 133% of FPL and children age 6 and older 
with income up to 100% of FPL are “mandatory” Medicaid eligibles and thus children exempt 
from cost sharing requirements.  See id. 
 95. Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 § 6041(b)(3)(B), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396o-1 (West 2006). 
 96. Id. § 6042(a)(1)(A), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396o-1.  Co-payments on non-prescription drugs 
can be up to 20% of the cost of the drug for those with incomes over 150% of the FPL, and a 
“nominal” amount (up to $3 per prescription) for those with incomes below 150% of the FPL, 
including those with incomes below 100% of the FPL.  Id. § 6042(a)(2)(A), 42 U.S.C.A. § 
1396o-1. 
 97. See id. § 6042. 
 98. Id. § 6041(b)(2)(A), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396o-1 (West 2006). 
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The DRA also allows states to deny coverage and services to Medicaid 
recipients who are unable to pay premiums and co-payments.  States may 
permit health care providers to deny care and services to Medicaid 
beneficiaries who have unpaid co-payments—even in circumstances in which 
the recipient is financially unable to make payment.99  The DRA also allows 
states to terminate Medicaid coverage for failure to pay premiums for sixty 
days.100 
Kentucky has already taken advantage of the DRA’s new provisions and 
implemented state plan amendments to increase Medicaid cost-sharing.101  
There, most non-elderly adults—parents, pregnant women, and adults with 
disabilities—are now subject to increased co-pays, a $225 annual out of pocket 
maximum for prescription drugs, and a separate $225 maximum for other 
medical services.102 
B. Limited Benefits 
The DRA also gives states a new option to place children and parents in 
limited-benefit Medicaid plans with coverage similar to employer-sponsored 
insurance rather than Medicaid’s more comprehensive coverage.103  A number 
 
 99. See id. § 6041(d)(1), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396o-1 (West 2006).  For detailed analysis of the 
new premium and cost-sharing provisions, see The Deficit Reduction Act of 2005: Congress 
Targets Beneficiaries for Cuts, 224 HEALTH ADVOC. 1, 21–25 (2006), available at 
http://www.healthlaw.org/library.cfm (Click link to Medicaid Page; Click link to Deficit 
Reduction Act of 2005; Scroll to Document). 
 100. Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 § 6041(d)(2), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396o-1 (West 2006). 
 101. KyHealth Choices Medicaid Reform: Key Program Changes and Questions, MEDICAID 
FACTS (Kaiser Comm’n on Medicaid & Uninsured, Washington, D.C.), July 2006, at 1–2, 
available at http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/7530.pdf [hereinafter KyHealth Choices]. 
 102. Id.  Co-pays are not imposed for preventive services.  Id. at 2. 
 103. See Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 § 6044, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396u-7 (West 2006); see also 
Letter from Dennis G. Smith, Director of the Center for Medicare & Medicaid Services, to the 
State Medicaid Director, at 5 (Mar. 31, 2006), available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/smdl/ 
downloads/SMD06008.pdf; Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Roadmap to Medicaid 
Reform: New Options to Improve and Expand Insurance Coverage for Acute Care Needs (State 
Medicaid Director Letters), at 1 (Mar. 31, 2006), http://www.cms.hhs.gov/smdl/downloads/ 
Rvacutecare.pdf.  States may use benchmark coverage for all Medicaid-eligible children and for 
parents, elderly, and pregnant women who are not “mandatory” eligibles under the federal statute.  
Deficit Reduction Act of 2005: Implications for Medicaid (Kaiser Comm’n on Medicaid & 
Uninsured, Washington, D.C.), Feb. 2006 [hereinafter Implications for Medicaid], available at 
http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/7465.pdf.  Individuals who qualify for Medicare as well as 
Medicaid and those with long-term care needs are exempt from benchmark coverage.  Id.  Parents 
with incomes as low as 9% of the FPL fall above Medicaid mandatory eligibility levels and could 
be moved into mandatory benchmark coverage.  Id.  For an excellent discussion of issues raised 
by Medicaid limited benefits, see Sara Rosenbaum, Defined-Contribution Plans and Limited-
Benefit Arrangements: Implications for Medicaid Beneficiaries, POL’Y BRIEF (Geo. Wash. U. 
Sch. Pub. Health & Health Servs.), Sept. 13, 2006, http://www.gwumc.edu/sphhs/healthpolicy/ 
chsrp/downloads/Rosenbaum_AHIP_FNL_ 091306.pdf. 
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of states have used Medicaid waivers to expand Medicaid eligibility using 
limited benefit plans.104  However, the DRA gives states the option to reduce 
coverage to presently eligible groups through limited benefit plans, while 
requiring states to continue to use the more complicated waiver process to 
obtain federal permission to expand coverage through limited benefit plans.105 
Limited-benefit plans are already a state option in the SCHIP, the safety 
net health insurance program for children in families with incomes above 
Medicaid levels, typically between 100% to 200% of the FPL.106  The DRA 
allows states to use limited-benefit plans for lower income Medicaid 
children—even those with incomes below 100% of the FPL.107  It also allows 
limited-benefit plans for Medicaid-eligible parents and pregnant women who 
are not “mandatory” eligibles under federal law.108  In some states this includes 
parents with incomes as low as 9% of the FPL.109  Moreover, CMS has 
interpreted the DRA to allow states to offer all Medicaid recipients the choice 
of enrolling in limited plans rather than traditional Medicaid.110  Idaho, 
Kentucky, and West Virginia have already used this increased flexibility to 
reduce benefits, and enroll children and their parents in limited-benefit 
Medicaid plans.111 
Limited-benefit plans are typically referred to as “benchmark” coverage 
because plans must be similar to policies offered in the private market.112  The 
DRA gives states a wide variety of plans they may benchmark against: the 
standard Blue Cross/Blue Shield Plan offered under the Federal Employee 
Health Benefits Plan, a health plan offered by the state to its own employees, 
or a plan offered by an HMO with the largest commercial enrollment in the 
state.113  Benchmark equivalent coverage can also be any other coverage 
 
 104. See Rosenbaum, supra note 103, at 5. 
 105. Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 § 6041(b), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396o-1 (West 2006). 
 106. Health Coverage for Low-Income Populations, supra note 33, at 3. 
 107. Implications for Medicaid, supra note 103, at 4–5. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 3. 
 110. Letter from Dennis G. Smith, supra note 103, at 3; Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid 
Servs., supra note 103, at 2; see Judith Solomon, The Illusion of Choice: Vulnerable Medicaid 
Beneficiaries Being Placed in Scaled-Back “Benchmark” Benefit Packages (Ctr. on Budget & 
Pol’y Priorities, Washington, D.C.), Sept. 14, 2006, at 1, available at http://www.cbpp.org/9-14-
06health.pdf. 
 111. KyHealth Choices, supra note 101, at 1–2; West Virginia Medicaid State Plan 
Amendment: Key Program Changes and Questions, MEDICAID FACTS (Kaiser Comm’n on 
Medicaid & Uninsured, Washington, D.C.), July 2006, at 1, available at http://www.kff.org/ 
medicaid/upload/7529.pdf; Rosenbaum, supra note 103, at 5. 
 112. Health Coverage for Low-Income Populations, supra note 33, at 3. 
 113. See Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., supra note 103, at 1. 
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proposed by the state that the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 
(CMS) determines provides “appropriate” coverage.114 
Limited-benefit plans reduce Medicaid coverage.  Even the most generous 
benchmark plans do not offer key services covered by traditional Medicaid: 
family planning, case management, personal care services, non-emergency 
transportation to and from medical care, nursing home care, intermediate care 
facilities for children and adults with developmental disabilities, and home and 
community based services.115  Moreover, since the DRA gives states the option 
to benchmark to any “health plan offered by the state to its own employees,” 
states now have the option to force Medicaid-eligible parents and children into 
“bare bones” catastrophic coverage with a high deductible if such an option is 
available to state employees.116 
Moreover, benchmark private insurance plans use more restrictive 
definitions of “medical necessity” than does traditional Medicaid.117  Private 
plans place limits on rehabilitation services like physical, occupational, and 
speech therapy and home health services that are not permitted under 
traditional Medicaid rules.118 
Private insurance does not cover the outreach, education, and screening 
services provided by Medicaid’s EPSDT program.  The DRA requires that 
children enrolled in benchmark plans be provided EPSDT services as “wrap 
around” services, i.e., as an additional benefit to their limited-benefit plan.119  
However, it is unclear how well children will be able to access EPSDT 
services offered separate and apart from their benchmark plan. 
 
 114. Id. Benchmark equivalent coverage must include inpatient and outpatient hospital 
services, physician services, laboratory and x-ray services, well-baby and well-child care 
including immunizations, and other appropriate prevention services.  Letter from Dennis G. 
Smith, supra note 103, at 4. Benchmark coverage must also provide coverage for rural health 
clinic and federally qualified health center services for all recipients.  Deficit Reduction Act of 
2005 § 6044(a)(4). 
 115. Health Coverage for Low-Income Populations, supra note 33, at 3. 
 116. See Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 § 6044(b)(1)(B), 42 U.S.C.A. 1396u-7 (West 2006) 
(explaining that benchmark coverage includes any “plan that is offered and generally available to 
State employees”). 
 117. Health Coverage for Low-Income Populations, supra note 33, at 3. 
 118. Id. at 3. 
 119. Id.  The DRA also requires that states ensure that both child and adult beneficiaries with 
benchmark coverage have access to rural health clinics and federally qualified health center 
(FQHC) services.  Letter from Dennis G. Smith, supra note 103, at 5. 
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C. High Deductibles + Health Savings Accounts 
The DRA also introduces high-deductible coverage combined with health 
savings accounts (HASs) to Medicaid, authorizing the Secretary of Health and 
Human Services to allow up to ten states to set up Health Opportunity Account 
(HOA) demonstrations.120  To many, high-deductible insurance policies 
combined with HSAs are the signature form of consumer-directed health 
care.121  High deductibles + HSAs are designed to give consumers the financial 
incentive to keep their health care costs below the amount in their HSAs.  Not 
only are consumers allowed to retain money remaining in the account at the 
end of the year but these plans also typically create a “donut hole” gap between 
the annual HSA deposited amount and catastrophic health insurance coverage. 
States participating in the HOA demonstration will be allowed to 
voluntarily enroll Medicaid-eligible parents and children in coverage that 
combines high deductibles + HSAs.122  States may claim federal Medicaid 
matching funds for HOA deposits of up to $2,500 per adult and $1,000 per 
child.123  States must provide participating families with high-deductible 
Medicaid coverage, but the DRA authorizes states to impose a donut hole of up 
to $250 per adult and $100 per child beyond the funds in the HOA before 
Medicaid coverage begins.124 
Prior to passage of the DRA, South Carolina was negotiating a Section 
1115 waiver to give recipients the option of Medicaid-funded, risk-adjusted 
“personal health accounts” in lieu of traditional Medicaid.125  While South 
Carolina is revamping its plan in light of new DRA provisions, the original 
proposal provides a glimpse of how states may try to structure HOA 
demonstrations. 
Under South Carolina’s proposal, once an individual’s HSA is exhausted, 
he or she must cover a donut hole of $250 before being eligible for 
catastrophic coverage through a Medicaid-approved private managed care plan 
or Preferred Provider Organization (PPO).126  Each personal health account is 
 
 120. Implications for Medicaid, supra note 103, at 6. 
 121. See also Michele Melden, Guarding Against the High Risk of High Deductible Health 
Plans: A Proposal for Regulatory Protections, 18 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 403, 403 (2006); see, 
e.g., Carolyn M. Clancy & Anne K. Gauthier, Consumer-Driven Health Care—Beyond Rhetoric 
with Research and Experience, 39 HEALTH SERVS. RES. 1049 (2004); . 
 122. Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 § 6082(b)(5), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396u-8 (West 2006). 
 123. Id. § 6082(d)(2)(C), 42 U.S.C.A. 1396u–8 (West 2006). 
 124. Deductibles cannot exceed 110% of the amount contributed by the state.  Deficit 
Reduction Act of 2005 § 6082(c)(2), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396u-8 (West 2006).  These maximum 
amounts are subject to be increased based upon inflation.  Id. 
 125. ROBERT M. KERR, S.C. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., SOUTH CAROLINA 
MEDICAID CHOICE: AN 1115 DEMONSTRATION WAIVER PROPOSAL 10 (2005), 
http://www.dhhs.state.sc.us/Internet/pdf/SCMC.pdf.  For descriptions of other aspects of the 
South Carolina waiver proposal, see Solomon, supra note 86, at 1. 
 126. Solomon, supra note 86, at 1. 
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risk-rated based on the person’s age, sex, eligibility category, and (in some 
cases) health status.127  However, fears are that risk rating systems are still 
rather inaccurate, and individuals often have unanticipated medical problems, 
making it likely that participants will exhaust their accounts and run into the 
$250 donut hole.128 
D. Vouchers 
The DRA does not give states the option to use Medicaid vouchers, but 
Florida has an approved Section 1115 waiver to transform the state’s Medicaid 
program into a Medicaid voucher system.129  While health spending accounts 
provide consumers with money with which to directly purchase health care, 
health insurance vouchers give consumers a set dollar amount to be used 
toward the purchase of health insurance coverage.130  Both are forms of 
defined contribution health plans that place the consumer at increased financial 
risk when compared with traditional health insurance.  HSAs place consumers 
at risk that their health care costs will be less than the amount in their health 
spending account.  Health insurance vouchers place consumers at risk that their 
voucher will not cover the cost of adequate health insurance. 
Florida’s voucher program assigns each Medicaid recipient a “risk-
adjusted premium” based on their health status and historic use of Medicaid 
services.131  Medicaid-eligible Floridians can use the vouchers to purchase 
health insurance from Medicaid-approved managed-care plans, or through 
employer-sponsored or individual insurance coverage.132  Recipients who use 
 
 127. Id. at 6. 
 128. Id. at 6–7.  South Carolina’s Section 1115 Waiver proposal would also allow recipients 
to use the funds as a voucher: (1) to purchase an individual private insurance policy, through a 
Managed Care Organization or other entity, (2) to purchase coverage through a Medicaid PPO 
“medical home network,” or (3) to purchase employer-sponsored insurance.  Id.  Recipients 
opting to purchase PPO “medical home network” coverage would be charged their entire personal 
health accounts (PHAs).  Id.  With the other three options, recipients could keep any amount in 
their PHA remaining after paying their health insurance premium and out-of-pockets costs.  Id.  
Private insurance plans would not be required to provide the range of benefits now offered under 
Medicaid.  Id. 
 129. Gov. Jeb Bush, Market Principles: The Right Prescription for Medicaid, 17 STAN. L. & 
POL’Y REV. 33 (2006); Joan Alker, Understanding Florida’s Medicaid Waiver Application, 
POL’Y BRIEF (Winter Park Health Found., Winter Park, Fla.), Sept. 2005, at 4, available at 
http://www.wphf.org/pubs/briefpdfs/Medicaid5.pdf. 
 130. Alker, supra note 129, at 4. 
 131. FLA. MEDICAID REFORM, FLA. AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMIN., APPLICATION FOR 
1115 RESEARCH AND DEMONSTRATION WAIVER 8 (2005), available at http://www.fccmh.org/ 
content/1/file/medicaid_reform_waiver_final_101905.pdf. 
 132. Id. at 4–5, 30–33; see also SARA ROSENBAUM & ANNE MARKUS, COMMONWEALTH 
FUND, THE DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT OF 2005: AN OVERVIEW OF KEY MEDICAID PROVISIONS 
AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR EARLY CHILDHOOD DEVELOPMENT SERVICES (2005), available 
at http://www.cmwf.org/usr_doc/Rosenbaum_DRA_Medicaid_ provisions_958.pdf; Alker, supra 
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their vouchers for private insurance are responsible for any premium costs in 
excess of their voucher, all patient cost-sharing such as deductibles and co-
payments, and all costs of uncovered services.133 
For Medicaid-approved plans, Florida is giving the private plans more 
flexibility to design benefit packages that differ from each other and from 
Florida’s previous Medicaid coverage.134  The state hopes to generate a variety 
of plan types to better meet the special needs of various types of Medicaid 
beneficiaries, particularly those with serious and chronic health problems.135  
However, the state does not guarantee that a recipient’s voucher will be 
sufficient to purchase the plan that best meets his or her specific medical 
needs.136  Neither does the state have any financial responsibility if a Medicaid 
approved plan’s benefit package does not cover unanticipated medical needs 
that arise during the enrollment year.137 
Moreover, all adults except pregnant women who purchase state approved 
private Medicaid plans will be subject to an annual maximum benefit limit on 
covered services.138  When the cost of care reaches this limit, neither the state 
 
note 129 (describing various aspects of the Florida waiver); Cindy Mann & Samantha Artiga, 
New Developments in Medicaid Coverage: Who Bears Financial Risk and Responsibility?, ISSUE 
PAPER (Kaiser Comm’n on Medicaid & Uninsured, Washington, D.C.), June 2006, at 1, available 
at http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/7507.pdf; The Medicaid Program at a Glance, supra note 
58. 
 133. FLA. MEDICAID REFORM, supra note 131, at 33. 
 134. Id. at 17.  Plans must cover all services that are mandatory under federal Medicaid law, 
but there is increased flexibility to determine which optional Medicaid services to cover and 
increased discretion to determine the amount, duration, and scope of covered services, including 
setting numerical limits on services such as physician visits or prescription drug coverage.  Id.  
Benefit packages must meet the state’s sufficiency standard which requires that “the overall level 
of services provided is appropriate for the premium received.”  FLA. MEDICAID REFORM, 
IMPLEMENTATION PLAN, available at http://ahca.myflorida.com/Medicaid/medicaid_reform/ 
implementationplan/implementationplan_11-29-05.pdf; see Mann & Artiga, supra note 132, at 
21, n.16 (“Neither the waiver nor the state’s implementation plan for the waiver requires coverage 
of all currently covered optional services; state legislation enacted to implement the waiver may 
require optional services be covered but not any particular scope of coverage.”). 
 135. See, e.g., Fla. Medicaid Reform, Fla. Agency for Health Care Admin., Medicaid Reform 
Expansion, http://ahca.myflorida.com/Medicaid/medicaid_reform/ (last visited Feb. 15, 2007). 
 136. For example, the following sources provide comprehensive detail about the Florida 1115 
waiver and make no mention of a guarantee: FLA. MEDICAID REFORM, supra note 131; FLA. 
MEDICAID REFORM, supra note 134.  “Neither the waiver nor the state’s implementation plan for 
the waiver requires coverage of all currently covered optional services; state legislation enacted to 
implement the waiver may require optional services be covered but not any particular scope of 
coverage.”  Mann & Artiga, supra note 132, at 21 n.16.  “[T]he overall level of services provided 
is appropriate for the premium received.”  Id. at 10. 
 137. See Mann & Artiga, supra note 132, at 1. 
 138. FLA. MEDICAID REFORM, supra note 131, at 23.  Children will also be required to enroll 
in the new system, but plans offered to children are not subject to the maximum cap and such 
plans must offer the full range of Medicaid EPSDT services.  Id. at 17. 
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nor the Medicaid approved private plan is responsible for covering further 
medical costs.139  Florida officials estimate that annually 5% of Medicaid 
recipients—those with the most serious chronic and disabling medical 
conditions—will max out their benefit coverage.140 
Thus, consumer-directed Medicaid is born: higher cost-sharing, limited 
benefits, high deductibles + HSAs, and vouchers purposefully shift the cost of 
medical care to Medicaid patients.  This cost-shifting seeks to incentivize 
Medicaid recipients to be prudent consumers of health care, but it also shifts 
the financial risk to low-income families who have few resources to absorb 
these additional costs. 
III.  THE VIEW FROM THE BOTTOM 
A triumvirate of ideas governs consumer-directed Medicaid: First, 
Medicaid is no longer a safety net for the “truly needy,” but a program that 
includes those who should be able to purchase health insurance or health care 
in the private market.  Second, the working families who now make up a 
majority of Medicaid recipients do need the comprehensive coverage that 
Medicaid provides: coverage that mimics employer-sponsored insurance 
should be adequate.  Third, Medicaid costs are high and quality is low because 
Medicaid recipients are shielded from the cost of care.  Each of these ideas 
rests on false premises. 
First, it is not just the very poor who are priced out of private insurance, 
low- and even moderate-income working Americans can no longer afford 
private insurance premiums and need some kind of safety net health insurance.  
Since 2000, the percentage of firms offering health insurance has slipped from 
69% to 61%: Only 42% of workers earning less than $20,000 a year have an 
employer who offers health benefits.141  Among firms that offer health 
insurance, premiums have skyrocketed 87% while workers’ wages have 
increased by only 22%.142 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 139. Id. at 21–23. 
 140. Robert Pear, U.S. Gives Florida A Sweeping Right to Curb Medicaid, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
20, 2005, at A1. 
 141. KFF/HRET 2006 ANNUAL SURVEY, supra note 43, at 35.  Also, higher income workers 
are more likely to work for employers who offer health insurance.  Id.  Sixty-five percent of 
employers who pay two-thirds of their work force at least $20,000 annually offer health benefits, 
but only 42% of employers who pay two-thirds of their work force $20,000 or less annually offer 
health benefits.  Id. 
 142. See id. at 32. 
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In 2006, a full-time minimum wage worker earned about $11,000 a year, 
but the annual premium for employer-sponsored health insurance averaged 
$11,480 for a family of four and $4,242 for single coverage.143  Even with an 
employer subsidy, the average worker’s share of the premium was $2,973 a 
year for family coverage and $627 for single.144  The issue is not that Medicaid 
has expanded beyond the “truly needy,” but that more American families 
“truly need” an affordable alternative to private insurance. 
In 2004, the median family of four had to earn $36,120 just to cover basic 
costs for housing, utilities, food, transportation, child care, state and local 
taxes, and other necessities such as telephone, clothes, and household 
supplies.145  In higher cost cities, the same family needed between $40,000 and 
$50,000 to cover these basic needs.146  On average, U.S. families must earn 
about 200% of the FPL to cover basic expenses, and more than half of 
Americans live in cities where it takes between 200% and 300% of the FPL to 
cover basic expenses.  And these figures do not include health care premiums 
or out-of-pocket costs. 
 
 
 
 143. Id. at 18. 
 144. Id. at 60. 
 145. See Economic Policy Institute Basic Family Budget Calculator (2004), available at 
http://www.epinet.org/content.cfm/datazone_fambud_budget. 
 146. Id. 
Increases in Health Insurance Premiums 
Compared to Other Indicators, 1988-2005 
Source: Kaiser Family Foundation & Health Research and Educational Trust, 
Employer Health Benefits: 2005 Annual Survey 1 (2005). 
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Basic Budget for Family of Four, 2004 Estimates147 
 St. Louis, 
Misouri 
Boston, 
Massachusetts 
Median 
Sioux City, 
Iowa 
Johnstown, 
Pennsylvania 
 
Rural 
Missouri 
Housing & 
Heat 
$741 $1,266 $585 $428 $459 
Food $587 $587 $587 $587 $587 
Transportation $358 $321 $375 $375 $420 
Child Care $835 $1,298 $924 $954 $523 
Other 
Necessities 
$359 $500 $316 $274 $282 
Taxes $316 $824 $223 $243 $24 
Monthly 
Budget 
$3,196 $4,896 $3,010 $2,861 $2,295 
Annual Budget $38,352 $58,752 $36,120 $34,332 $27,540 
% FPL 203% 305% 192% 182% 146% 
 
Contrary to popular perception, people who earn double and even triple the 
FPL are “truly needy” in today’s economy.  The FPL uses a formula developed 
in the early 1960s by Molly Orshansky, an employee of the Social Security 
Administration.148  In the mid-1950s American families spent about one-third 
 
 147. Id.; Sylvia Allegretto, Basic Family Budgets: Working Families’ Incomes Fail to Meet 
Living Expenses Around the U.S., Econ. Pol’y Inst. Briefing Paper, at 3–4 (2004), available at 
http://www.epinet.org/briefingpapers/165/bp165.pdf.  Costs are for a basic family budget.  
Housing costs are based on the Department of Housing and Urban Development’s fair market 
rents for the lower 40th percentile.  Food costs are based on the USDA’s low-cost plan to achieve 
nutritionally adequate diets.  Transportation expenses are based on the costs of owning and 
operating a car for work and other necessary trips drawn from the National Travel Household 
Survey by metropolitan or rural area.  Child care is based on center-based child care or family 
child care centers for 4 to 8 year-olds as reported by the Children’s Defense Fund.  Other 
necessities include: the cost of telephone, clothing, personal care expenses, household supplies, 
school supplies, etc. from the Consumer Expenditure Survey.  Taxes are for tax year 2004 as 
computed by Citizens for Tax Justice and include federal tax credits for children and the earned 
income tax credit. Taxes include federal personal income taxes, federal Social Security and 
Medicare payroll taxes (worker payments only), and state and local income or wage taxes.  The 
2004 federal poverty guideline for a family of four in the continental U.S. was $18,850.  U.S. 
Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., The 2004 HHS Poverty Guidelines, http://aspe.hhs.gov/poverty/ 
04poverty.shtml (last visited Feb. 28, 2007). 
 148. See Mollie Orshansky, Children of the Poor, SOC. SEC. BULL., July 1963, at 3; see also 
U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., Frequently Asked Questions Related to Poverty Guidelines 
and Poverty, http://aspe.hhs.gov/poverty/faq.shtml (last visited Feb. 28, 2007) [hereinafter 
Poverty Guidelines FAQ] (describing the differences between the federal poverty thresholds and 
the federal poverty guidelines).  The correct term is “federal poverty guideline,” but the figures 
are typically referred to as the federal poverty level or federal poverty line.  See U.S. Dep’t of 
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of their after-tax income on food, so Orshansky calculated poverty thresholds 
by multiplying the cost of the United States Department of Agriculture’s least 
expensive food plan by three to estimate the costs of basic household 
expenses.149  Orshansky’s formula is still used to calculate the FPL, but now 
food costs reflect only about one-sixth of household expenses resulting in an 
FPL that underestimates basic living costs by almost one-half.150 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thus, even small premiums can price families earning less than 300% of 
the FPL out of insurance: States that have imposed Medicaid and SCHIP 
premiums well below the 5% of income cap allowed by the DRA have seen 
 
Health & Hum. Servs., Poverty Guidelines, http://aspe.hhs.gov/poverty/06poverty.shtml (last 
visited Feb. 28, 2007).  The federal poverty threshold is the original version of the federal poverty 
measure.  Poverty Guidelines FAQ, supra.  It is used mainly for statistical purposes, i.e., 
estimating the number of people living below that threshold each year.  See Off. Mgmt. & 
Budget, Statistical Policy Directive No. 14: Definition of Poverty for Statistical Purposes (May 
1978), available at http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/povmeas/ombdir14.html.  The federal 
poverty guidelines are issued each year in the Federal Register by the Department of Health and 
Human Services and are used for administrative purposes to determine financial eligibility for 
certain federal programs.  Poverty Guidelines FAQ, supra. 
 149. Orshansky, supra note 148, at 3, 8–10; Poverty Guidelines FAQ, supra note 148.  In 
1965 Orshansky expanded and adjusted her poverty measures to encompass virtually all family 
sizes.  See Mollie Orshansky, Who’s Who Among the Poor: A Demographic View of Poverty, 
SOC. SEC. BULL., July 1965, at 3; see also Gordon M. Fisher, The Development and History of 
the Poverty Thresholds, SOC. SEC. BULL., Winter 1992, at 3 (discussing the origins of the poverty 
levels). 
 150. See Federal Poverty Guidelines FAQ, supra note 148.  The FPLs are updated annually to 
account for increases in the Consumer Price Index, but the underlying formula is still 
Orshansky’s, i.e., multiply the cost of the USDA thrifty food plan by three.  Id.  For criticisms of 
the methodology, see NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, MEASURING POVERTY: A NEW APPROACH 26–31 
(Constance F. Citro & Robert T. Michael eds., 1995). 
Federal Poverty Line, 2006 
 
Federal 
Poverty 
Guideline 
Family 
size 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
100% 
 
$9,800 $13,200 $16,600 $20,000 
200% 
 
$19,600 $26,400 $33,200 $40,000 
 
Source: U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., The 2006 HHS Poverty Guidelines, 
http://aspe.hhs.gov/poverty/06poverty.shtml. 
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substantial drops in enrollment.151  An Urban Institute analysis, based on these 
and other states’ experiences, concludes that premiums equal to 5% of income 
will price over 80% of potentially eligible families out of Medicaid.152 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Second, employer-sponsored insurance increasingly offers inadequate 
financial protection for low-income families: Even when low-income families 
are able to obtain private insurance through generous employer subsidies, out-
of-pocket costs can be staggering.  In 2006, the average deductible for 
employer-sponsored single-coverage was $352 for HMO coverage, $553 for 
point-of-service (POS), and $1,715 for high-deductible plans.153  Co-payments 
 
 151. See, e.g., Leighton Ku & Victoria Wachino, The Effect of Increased Cost Sharing in 
Medicaid: A Summary of Research Findings (Ctr. on Budget & Pol’y Priorities, Washington, 
D.C.), July 7, 2005, available at http://www.cbpp.org/5-31-05health2.pdf; Samantha Artiga & 
Molly O’Malley, Increasing Premiums and Cost-Sharing in Medicaid and SCHIP: Recent State 
Experiences, ISSUE PAPER (Kaiser Comm’n on Medicaid & Uninsured, Washington, D.C.), May 
2005, at 4, available at http://www.kff.org/medicaid/7322.cfm. 
 152. Leighton Ku & Teresa Coughlin, Sliding-Scale Premium Health Insurance Programs: 
Four States’ Experiences, 36 INQUIRY 471, 477 (1999). 
 153. KFF/HRET 2006 ANNUAL SURVEY, supra note 43, at 32, 78–79, 111.  Fifty-five (54.8) 
percent of workers must pay a general deductible.  Sixty percent of workers are covered by PPOs, 
Premiums as a Percent of Income
 
Source: Medicaid and Budget Reconciliation: Options and Implications of Savings Proposals 
(Kaiser Comm’n on Medicaid & Uninsured, Washington, D.C.), Oct. 2005, at 3.
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typically ranged from $15 to $20 for physician visits and $11 to $38 for 
prescription drugs.154 
Because private insurance imposes the same cost-sharing on all, these 
burdens fall more heavily on low-wage workers and the sick, and most heavily 
on those who are both low-wage and sick.  Workers with employer-insured 
insurance earning less than $10,000 per year spent on average 34% of their 
income on health insurance deductibles and co-payments.155  In comparison, 
workers earning over $50,000 a year spent only 4% of their income on medical 
out-of-pocket costs.156 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Medicaid coverage benchmarked to private plans is likely to leave 
Medicaid recipients paying even higher percentages of income on out-of-
pocket medical expenses: Medicaid recipients get a double whammy when it 
comes to out-of-pocket costs—they are both poorer and sicker than most 
Americans with private insurance.  More than half (53%) of Medicaid 
 
13% by POS, 20% by HMOs, 4% by high-deductible plans, and 3% by conventional plans.  See 
id.  The prevalence of general deductibles by plan type is as follows: 69% of PPOs impose 
general deductibles on workers, 32% of POS, 12% of HMOs and 100% of high deductible and 
conventional plans.  Id. at 81–82. 
 154. Id. at 121.  Prescription drug co-pays typically are tiered averaging $11 for generics, $24 
for preferred drugs, and $38 for non-preferred drugs.  Id. at 121. 
 155. PAUL FRONSTIN, COMMONWEALTH FUND, WORKER’S HEALTH INSURANCE: TRENDS, 
ISSUES AND OPTIONS TO EXPAND COVERAGE 8 (2006) (explaining that figures are for worker 
income and worker expenses and do not include family income or medical spending), available at 
http:www.cmwf.org/usr_doc/Fronstin_workershltins_908.pdf. 
 156. Id. 
Workers with ESI, Personal Out-of-Pocket  
Medical Expenses, 2002 
4.0%
34.0%
Annual Income Annual Income
 
 
Annual Income
 
< $10,000
Annual Income
 ≥ $50,000
 
Source: Paul Fronstin, Commonwealth Fund, Worker’s Health Insurance, Trends, 
Issues and Options to Expand Coverage (2006) (does not include premiums). 
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recipients are very poor, earning under 100% of the FPL, and another 28% are 
near poor, with incomes between 100% to 200% of the FPL.157  Most children 
and almost half of parents enrolled in Medicaid have serious functional health 
limitations.158 
Even now, Medicaid recipients are not insulated from the cost of medical 
care: Adults on Medicaid pay a larger share of their income on out-of-pocket 
medical expenses than do higher income privately insured Americans.159  In 
2002, non-disabled working adults with Medicaid coverage spent on average 
2.4% of their income on out-of-pocket medical expenses, and disabled adult 
Medicaid recipients spent almost 6% (5.6%) out-of-pocket for medical care.160  
In contrast, privately insured adults earning over 200% of the FPL spent on 
average less than 1%—only 0.7% on out-of-pocket medical costs.161 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 157. Kaiser Fam. Found., supra note 59. 
 158. ROSENBAUM & MARKUS, supra note 132. 
 159. Leighton Ku & Matthew Broaddus, Out-Of-Pocket Medical Expenses For Medicaid 
Beneficiaries Are Substantial and Growing (Ctr. on Budget & Pol’y Priorities, Washington, 
D.C.), May 31, 2005, at 2, fig. 2, available at http://www.cbpp.org/5-31-05health.pdf. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id.  Studies also demonstrate that in recent years, the share of Medicaid beneficiaries’ 
income that is consumed by out-of-pocket medical expenses has been rising twice as fast as their 
incomes.  Id. at 2, fig. 1. 
Percentage of Family Income Spent on 
Out-of-Pocket Medical Expenses, 2002 
5.6%
0.7%
2.4%
Non-
Disabled
Adults on
Medicaid
Disabled
Adults on
Medicaid
Privately
Insured
Adults
Non-Disabled Adults on 
Medicaid 
 
< 100% FPL 
Disabled Adults on 
Medicaid 
 
< 100% FPL 
Privately Insured Adults 
 
 
≥ 200% FPL 
 
Source: Leighton Ku & Matthew Broaddus, Out-of-Pocket Medical Expenses for 
Medicaid Beneficiaries are Substantial and Growing (Ctr. on Budget & Pol’y 
Priorities, Washington, D.C.), May 31, 2005, at fig. 2. 
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In stark contrast to the claims of consumer-driven health care, Medicaid’s 
generous benefit package has not resulted in higher costs: Medicaid actually 
costs less per enrollee than employer-provided health insurance.  In 2003, 
Medicaid spending averaged $1,872 per working parent and $1,467 per 
child,162 while the average cost for single employer-sponsored insurance was 
$3,383.163  Medicaid can insure two people—a parent and child—for less than 
the cost of employer-sponsored insurance for just the parent. 
Medicaid has also done a superb job of holding down per capita spending 
increases.  The growth in Medicaid spending for services is only about one-
third the growth in overall private insurance spending and only half the 
increase in premium costs for employer-sponsored insurance.164  From 2000 to 
2004, Medicaid per capita spending for acute care services rose 6.4% while 
long-term care costs rose only 4.2%.165  In comparison, private insurance per 
capita costs—primarily for acute care services—rose 9.5% for all Americans 
and 12.2% for those with employer-sponsored health insurance.166 
While low Medicaid reimbursement rates are one explanation for lower 
Medicaid costs, Medicaid also delivers lower cost coverage because it has 
lower administrative overhead.  State Medicaid programs report administrative 
costs of only 4% to 6%, compared with private HMO administrative costs of 
8% to 12% and commercial health insurer administrative costs of 15% to 
20%.167 
Neither has Medicaid’s more comprehensive benefit package resulted in 
unnecessary medical care.  No data substantiates claims that Medicaid 
recipients overuse medical care.  To the contrary, one study of thirteen states 
found that adult Medicaid beneficiaries use about the same level of health care 
services as adults with private health insurance who have higher cost-
 
 162. Kaiser Fam. Found., Medical Payments per Enrollee, FY2003, 
http://www.statehealthfacts.org/ (Click 50 State Comparisons Link; Select Medicaid & SCHP 
from left column; Click Payments by Enrollee Group, FY2003 in left column under Medicaid 
Spending). 
 163. KAISER FAM. FOUND. & HEALTH RES. & EDUC. TRUST, EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS: 
2003 ANNUAL SURVEY 32 (2003), available at http://www.kff.org/insurance/upload/Kaiser-
Family-Foundation-2003-Employer-Health-Benefits-Survey-Full-Report.pdf [hereinafter 
KFF/HRET 2003 ANNUAL SURVEY]. 
 164. SMITH ET AL., supra note 17, at 21. 
 165. Id. 
 166. KFF/HRET 2003 ANNUAL SURVEY, supra note 163; see also SMITH ET AL., supra note 
17, at 21. 
 167. SMITH & MOODY, supra note 55, at 8. 
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sharing.168  Another study of mothers in low-incomes families found similar 
results.169 
Shifting costs to Medicaid recipients will not result in better quality care: It 
will result in poorer care and worse outcomes.  Cost-sharing is perhaps the 
most studied aspect of the Medicaid program: a plethora of research concludes 
that even modest co-payments—far below those contemplated by the DRA—
cause Medicaid patients to forego necessary, not just excess, medical care.170  
The RAND Health Insurance Experiment, considered the landmark study of 
cost-sharing, found that although higher patient cost-sharing did not adversely 
affect the health of middle and higher income people, cost-sharing did create 
barriers to access and poorer health outcomes for lower income patients.171  A 
recent study in Minnesota found that when the state imposed tiered Medicaid 
drug co-payments of $1 for generic drugs and $3 for brand name drugs—far 
below amounts authorized by the DRA—slightly more than half of Medicaid 
patients using a public hospital reported being unable to fill prescriptions 
because of co-payment charges.172  About one-third of those who went without 
prescription drugs had more serious health problems, like strokes, diabetes 
problems, or asthma attacks, and required expensive emergency room care or 
hospital admission.173 
 
 168. Teresa A. Coughlin et al., Assessing Access to Care Under Medicaid: Evidence for the 
Nation and Thirteen States, 24 HEALTH AFF. 1073, 1081 (2005). 
 169. Sharon K. Long et al., How Well Does Medicaid Work in Improving Access to Care?, 40 
HEALTH SERVS. RES. 39, 55 (2005). 
 170. See, e.g., Artiga & O’Malley, supra note 151, at 3; Ku & Wachino, supra note 151, at 
11; Bill J. Wright, et al., The Impact of Increased Cost-Sharing on Medicaid Enrollees, 24 
HEALTH AFF. 1106 (2005). 
 171. JOSEPH NEWHOUSE, FREE FOR ALL? LESSONS FROM THE RAND INSURANCE 
EXPERIMENT 183–243 (1993).  The RAND study found that co-payments led to a marked 
reduction in “episodes of effective care” among low-income adults and children.  As a 
consequence, health status was poorer among low-income adults and children who were reported 
to make co-payments to obtain care than among comparable low-income adults and children who 
were not subject to payments. Id. at 251; see also JONATHON GRUBER, KAISER FAM. FOUND., 
THE ROLE OF CONSUMER COPAYMENTS FOR HEALTH CARE: LESSONS FROM THE RAND 
HEALTH INSURANCE EXPERIMENT AND BEYOND (2006), available at http://www.kff.org/ 
insurance/upload/7566.pdf. 
 172. Melody Mendiola et al., Hennepin County Medical Center (Minneapolis, Minn.), 
Medicaid Patients Perceive Copays as a Barrier to Medication Compliance, Presentation at the 
Society of General Internal Medicine National Conference (May 2005). 
 173. Id.  A Canadian study found that after Quebec imposed co-payments for prescription 
drugs on adults who were receiving welfare, these individuals filled fewer prescriptions for 
essential medications and emergency room use subsequently increased 14% among these adults.  
Robyn Tamblyn et al., Adverse Events Associated with Prescription Drug Cost-Sharing Among 
Poor and Elderly Persons, 285 JAMA 421 (2001).  The number of “adverse events” such as 
death and hospitalization rose by 78%.  Id. 
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In fact, studies show that Medicaid provides better quality preventive 
services for children than does private health insurance.174  Advocates of 
consumer-driven Medicaid taut SCHIP benchmark coverage as a model for 
redesigning Medicaid co-payments and benefits, but studies show that 
Medicaid-like SCHIP coverage results in better quality care—and better health 
outcomes—than does SCHIP coverage that is benchmarked to private 
insurance.175 
Finally, increased Medicaid cost-sharing puts financial pressures on low 
income families already juggling tight budgets.  In Oregon, more than a third 
of Medicaid recipients subject to increased Medicaid cost-sharing reported 
cutting back on food to pay for medical costs.176  Another study reported that 
nearly 30% of families with incomes up to 200% of the FPL had at least one 
critical hardship such as missed meals, an eviction, utilities disconnected, 
doubling up in housing, or inability to access needed medical care.177  Over 
72% of these families reported at least one serious hardship such as worries 
about food, missed rent or mortgage payments, reliance on the emergency 
room as the main source of medical care, or inadequate child care 
arrangements.178 
CONCLUSION 
Consumer-directed Medicaid rests on false assumptions.  Medicaid has 
grown, but it remains a program for those who priced out of private health 
insurance.  Medicaid’s comprehensive benefit package and relatively low-cost 
sharing are crucial design components for a safety net health insurance 
program covering those with limited financial resources.  No data supports the 
claims of critics that Medicaid recipients overuse medical services.  In fact, 
studies conclude that Medicaid delivers better quality care to low-income 
Americans than coverage modeled on private insurance. 
 
 174. Lisa Dubay & Genevieve M. Kenney, Health Care Access and Use Among Low-Income 
Children: Who Fares Best?, HEALTH AFF., Jan.-Feb. 2001, at 112, 116 (explaining their study 
which looked at children in families with incomes between 100% to 200% of the FPL). 
 175. This outcome likely reflects the success of Medicaid in facilitating preventive services 
for children as well as Medicaid’s historical lower cost sharing 
 176. BILL J. WRIGHT ET AL., COMMONWEALTH FUND, IMPACT OF CHANGES TO PREMIUMS, 
COST-SHARING AND BENEFITS ON ADULT MEDICAID BENEFICIARIES: RESULTS FROM AN ON-
GOING STUDY OF THE OREGON HEALTH PLAN 11 (2005), available at http://www.cmwf.org/ 
usr_doc/Wright_impact_changes_premiums_Medicaid_Oregon.pdf. 
 177. See HEATHER BOUSHEY ET AL., ECON. POL’Y INST., HARDSHIPS IN AMERICA: THE 
REAL STORY OF WORKING FAMILIES 2 (2001). 
 178. See id.  While the very poor, those living below the FPL, have the most difficulty 
making ends meet, the rate of hardships was almost identical for the near-poor, those with 
incomes between 100% and 200% of the FPL, and the very poor.  Id. 
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Ultimately, cost-shifting to Medicaid patients hurts not only consumers but 
the health care system.  Medicaid plays a critical role in funding the nation’s 
safety net hospitals and clinics.  When costs are shifted to patients, they may 
go unpaid.  For some hospitals this translates into a drop in funding, for others 
it translates into more aggressive collection actions against patients.179  For 
patients who can qualify for credit cards, it may begin a cycle of debt that ends 
in bankruptcy.180  As the title of this symposium says, cost-shifting to 
Medicaid patients is likely to go “from risk to ruin.” 
 
 179. See John D. Colombo, Federal and State Tax Exemption Policy, Medical Debt and 
Healthcare for the Poor, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 433, 443–44 (2007); Nancy M. Kane, Tax-Exempt 
Hospitals: What Is Their Charitable Responsibility and How Should It Be Defined and 
Reported?, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 459, 459–62 (2007). 
 180. See Melissa B. Jacoby, The Debtor-Patient Revisited, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 307, 319–20 
(2007). 
